Lauren Barden-Hair

I am a UC Berkeley PhD candidate studying international relations and comparative politics.

My research agenda sits at the intersection of international security and international political economy and investigates the complex dynamics of state and non-state interactions in global politics. Drawing on literatures from international security and political economy, I explore how states leverage indirect tools—such as instrumentalization of corporations for global security objectives or support for foreign rebel groups—to advance their strategic interests. My dissertation engages contemporary concerns about firms such as Huawei and Tiktok by providing a new definition and theoretical framework for the use of MNC commercial channels to covertly achieve security objectives. Adopting a mixed-methods approach, my research uses original quantitative data, case studies, and archival research, using cross-national and historical comparisons to shed light on contemporary challenges. My work also includes fieldwork in Taiwan, a country where I have previously lived and hold extensive cultural experience. Additional and future projects build upon my dissertation and advance research at the frontier of international security and international political economy, with particular attention given to non-state actors that facilitate global exchange.

Books in Progress

Firm Instrumentalization: The Use of Multinational Corporations in Covert State Operations

New evidence shows multinational corporations (MNCs) regularly accept state requests to become covert instruments of foreign security policy. These requests are not limited to domestic-based firms: in many cases, states are also able to achieve instrumentalization of foreign firms. The prevalence of these incidents suggests previous theories about state and MNC dynamics are incomplete. Drawing from findings in economic sociology and regional scholarship on East Asia, I propose that the regime type of the instrumentalizing state influences the ease, mechanisms, and likely success of conducting firm instrumentalization. While it is often easier for authoritarian regimes to draw firms into instrumentalization due to the many stick and carrot institutional levers at their disposal, firms based in these locations are often treated with more suspicion internationally due to public knowledge of state tools of control. In contrast, liberal market regimes lack many of these coercive levers, as firms in these contexts operate with a high degree of independence from state power. I argue that in such least-likely environs, the state turns to personal ties between elites and intelligence leaders to compensate for the lack of formal coercive mechanisms. These personal ties reduce the uncertainty surrounding the request and increase confidence that the firm will comply. Thus, while it may be harder for liberal market states to initiate such arrangements—once established—they may be more operationally secure. I use a mixed-methods approach to test these mechanisms, with an original dataset of US news firms that were instrumentalized between 1950-1970 and case study analysis of China’s instrumentalization of firms in Taiwan. The project sheds light on a pressing geopolitical concern, tests patterns in its cross-national use, and proposes new criteria for assessing national security risks in global trade.

Working Papers

Introducing Firm Instrumentalization: The Use of Multinational Corporations in Covert State Operations

Amidst contemporary security concerns about Huawei and TikTok, this research introduces the concept of firm instrumentalization-the covert repurposing of multinational corporations (MNCs) by states for foreign security policy. While existing scholarship often depicts MNCs as independent actors with substantial influence, this research demonstrates that firms have repeatedly engaged in covert arrangements in pursuit of state security objectives, despite significant profit risks. The primary argument is that the regime type of the instrumentalizing state influences the ease, mechanisms, and likely success of conducting firm instrumentalization. While it is often easier for authoritarian regimes to co-opt firms due to the many stick and carrot institutional levers at their disposal, firms based in these locations are often treated with more suspicion. In contrast, liberal market regimes lack many of these coercive levers, as firms in these contexts operate with a high degree of institutional independence. I argue that in such least-likely environs, the state turns to personal ties between intelligence elites and firm leaders to facilitate successful instrumentalization. The theory is supported by quantitative analysis using an original dataset of US news firms between 1950-1970 and qualitative analysis of China’s instrumentalization of firms in Taiwan.

Link to latest version

The Blame Game: How Multi-State Violations Undermine the Efforts of Human Rights NGOs

The naming and shaming literature has been theoretically and empirically focused on the behavior of individual states. However, real-world examples such as external support for rebel groups illustrate that many human rights violations can be traced to the direct or indirect actions of more than one country. This project shows how multi-state violations are common in global politics and how they complicate each stage of the naming and shaming process. Drawing on insights from behavioral psychology and organizational incentives, I argue that multi-state violations hinder efforts to identify and report responsibility through three mechanisms: information complexity, organizational incentives, and room to maneuver. I test the theory by analyzing nested case studies of two rebel groups in 1990s India, where one group received support from multiple states and the other from a single state. Despite similar circumstances, each of the multiple states backing a rebel group faced significantly less NGO condemnation. I further support this with a comparison from Central America in the 1980s and a contemporary example of post-shaming blame deflection. I also illustrate how the findings apply to another issue area: environmental advocacy. These findings highlight challenges for human rights promotion and international accountability generally, and link the rapidly expanding literature on external support for rebels to scholarship on human rights and state reputation, yielding important insights.

Papers in Progress

Fool Me Once: Assessing the Potential Costs of Firm Instrumentalization Using Survey Experiments

What are the costs of firm instrumentalization, for both states and firms? This study measures the potential reputational and political costs of firm instrumentalization among U.S. consumers and voters. Using simulated “leaked” scenarios modeled on real-world cases, the project examines public reactions to two situations: a Chinese commercial airline flying over the United States as part of a covert surveillance operation, and a U.S. airline conducting a similar operation over Chinese territory. The experiment introduces a fictional airline, portrayed as a neutral, realistic carrier expected to operate five years in the future, to serve as the baseline condition. Respondents are presented with treatment vignettes and asked to evaluate their future willingness to fly with the airline, their support for imposing penalties on the firm involved, and their favorability toward the government that directed the covert activity. I hypothesize that revelations of firm instrumentalization will reduce consumer willingness to use the airline in the future and support penalties. I also hypothesize that revelations will negatively impact voter favorability towards the instrumentalizing government, with effects conditional on the identities of the target and initiating states.

Cues from the Homeland: Authoritarian Influence and Diaspora Populations

In recent years, the political endorsements of foreign leaders during national elections have raised concerns about the influence of external elites and government campaigns on democratic processes. Notable examples include Turkish President Erdoğan’s appeals to diaspora Turks in Germany to oppose mainstream parties, and the Chinese government’s efforts to shape the political preferences of its diaspora, particularly in Australia. These developments prompt important questions: To what extent can homeland leaders shape the political preferences of diaspora communities in democracies? And why might diaspora populations be receptive to such cues? While existing research has thoroughly examined elite signaling and ethnic identity within domestic contexts, the transnational influence of homeland cues remains under-explored. I argue that diaspora individuals with stronger identity ties to their country of origin are more likely to respond to elite messages from homeland leaders. Moreover, I propose that those with stronger homeland attachments are more inclined to believe that what benefits the homeland will also benefit them personally. Finally, I hypothesize that diaspora members with strong identity ties will be more responsive to political cues from homeland elites than from domestic political figures. To test these claims, I draw on survey experiments and interviews conducted among Turkish diaspora populations in Germany and Chinese diaspora communities in Australia—two settings with large, politically salient diasporas that have recently drawn attention for their potential susceptibility to foreign influence.


Contact Info:

lauren_bardenhair19(at)berkeley.edu